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Islamophobia, victimism, identity politics

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Islamophobia, victimism, identity politics

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Islamophobia, victimism, identity politics

by Jean Szlamowicz

Social legitimacy is today based on victimization. This is an issue that decolonial thought has seized upon to transfer this status from the individual to the group: being a collective victim opens up a recognition that is not without affinities with the demand for positive discrimination, or even with a justification for cultural separatism. It was therefore necessary to invent state racism and state Islamophobia to demand community recognition that blithely overrides the demands of secularism and what has been hypocritically called “living together.”

We know that indoctrination begins with the seduction of words: by inserting the word Islamophobia into a system of fighting against injustice, its propagators have been able to place the defense of Islam in the camp of so-called progressivism even though it has become an offensive concept used to silence political and philosophical criticisms of Islamic infiltration.

Polarizations

Of course, proponents of the term consider it useful for highlighting the social stigma supposedly imposed on Muslims. But creating a socio-political category like Islamophobia is not simply using a word; it also draws upon a set of discourses that are considered validated by the term's existence. By promoting a label like Islamophobia , one lends credence to a victimhood narrative of Islam in France. As the CCIF (Collective Against Islamophobia in France) clearly understood, such a stance is ideologically advantageous and creates a polarization that breeds prejudice. The term carries with it the idea that Islamophobia is inherent to the Muslim condition and that France is thus nothing more than a land of apartheid. Herein lie the ingredients of a conflictual conception of society, constructing a Manichean worldview that sets the trap of identifying and indoctrinating Muslims "against" France. Decolonial discourse exacerbates this simplism within the framework of the "Manichean victimhood morality" described by sociologist Shmuel Trigano : "the condition of victim is the only source of legitimacy for the 'minority'" ( The New Dominant Ideology: Postmodernism , Hermann, 2012, p. 70).

The logic of sanctifying Islamophobia as a social identity traps Muslims in a false dichotomy, creating dissension with devastating social consequences and forcing everyone into an all-or-nothing political loyalty. This logic, in particular, fosters a sense of community defined by victimhood. This is how Didier Lemaire , a philosophy professor in Trappes who dared to write against Islamism, found himself facing hostility from his students: "My students asked me why I had written 'against them'" : such is the result of this logic of antagonism and polarization promoted by the notion of Islamophobia.

As psychoanalyst Daniel Sibony observes , Bin Laden gave his reasons for the 9/11 attacks: “to erase the humiliation.” But which one? Colonialism? Islam also practiced it, and its colonized peoples did not react in this way. Sibony then speaks of this “incandescent identity” offered by Islamic radicalism. Such a culture of resentment, blind to its own history, is a danger for Muslims pressured to succumb to this narcissistic identity-based recruitment.

Islamism begins by making Muslims believe that their cultural loyalty lies in adopting fundamentalism, which is thankfully far from the truth in society. But this is the identity-based illusion perpetuated by decolonialists: that identity exists only in the struggle against French culture. This trap then confines Muslims to a forced separatism, leading them to become entrenched in the posture of victimhood. This is what the word Islamophobia crystallizes , and what the CCIF—which was recognized as a public service organization by the government—and all those who, driven by electoral considerations, opportunism, or misguided compassion, have so intensely exploited, have found it advantageous to exalt the imagery of persecution in order to construct a future for it in the form of revenge.

The OIC and the Tactics of Islamophobia

The political emergence of the word Islamophobia is clearly linked to the rise of Islamism in Western societies. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, a bloc of 57 states represented at the UN, adopted in Cairo on August 5, 1990, a Declaration of Human Rights in Islam which defines rights and freedoms in relation to their conformity with Sharia law:

Freedom of opinion and expression is guaranteed to all […] But this freedom is limited to prevent it from being misused: there are boundaries that must not be crossed, otherwise there would be total chaos, violation of the laws of Allah, oppression of individuals and decadence of society. The restrictions on this freedom are as follows: […]

It is forbidden to attack the sacred beliefs accepted by Islamic society such as the existence of Allah, the truth of Muhammad's prophethood and to avoid anything that is likely to harm Islam and its followers.

As defined, Islamic rights clash head-on with freedom of expression as it exists in the West. Within the framework of diplomatic power struggles, the notion of Islamophobia clearly aims to become a legal concept criminalizing criticism of Islam, both theological and political. This is therefore the logical outcome of fundamentalism as promoted at the UN and UNESCO. These texts are indeed an extension of the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights promulgated by the Islamic Council of Europe in 1981 in Paris, at a meeting organized by UNESCO. It stated that "Everyone has the right to express their thoughts and beliefs as long as they remain within the limits prescribed by law."... but this had to be interpreted in light of an explanatory addition at the end of the text: "The term 'Law' means Sharia."

The promotion of the concept of Islamophobia has therefore taken place within the institutional and diplomatic framework through pressure from the OIC, which hosts an Observatory of Islamophobia on its website . The OIC Charter also promises to "combat the defamation of Islam" and to "help Muslim minorities living outside member states to preserve their dignity and their cultural and religious identity."

This conception of an Islam that would be practiced in all countries as well as in states governed by Sharia is distinctly Islamist. Pierre-André Taguieff reminded us of this in Islamism and Us (2017): “a Muslim individual is not reduced to the fact of being Muslim, except, precisely, if he is the follower of a form of Islamism. In this case, his personal identity is to be a ‘soldier of Islam’ engaged in propaganda actions or in a war against non-Muslims or ‘bad’ Muslims” (p. 190).

Under the influence of the OIC, it is this conception of Islam that the idea of ​​Islamophobia conveys. Under the pretext of fighting fundamentalism, by infiltrating the "Alliance of Civilizations" program (2004) with the support of the Arab League and Erdogan's Turkey, the OIC intends to promote Islam in Western culture, which the European Union has accepted through texts and treaties, with a voluntarism that explains the wavering of successive governments regarding the Islamic question.

Given this political culture that stigmatizes any offense against Islam and Muslims as "Islamophobic", how can we be surprised by the Charlie Hebdo attacks , the assassination of Samuel Paty and the long list of acts committed by individuals whipped into a frenzy by anti-Islamophobic rhetoric?

When the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb , offered a half-hearted condemnation of Samuel Paty's beheading, he did so by asserting that insulting religions in the name of freedom of expression constitutes "incitement to hatred ." This double standard, in which the condemnation of the crime serves as a concessionary argument, serves to reinforce the Islamic interpretative norm that subordinates free thought to adherence to Sharia law. Any transgression is considered an attack on Islam and allows for a portrayal of true faith as humiliated by the West.

The rhetoric of humiliation of Muslims is in fact a discourse of omnipotence: criticism is considered an aggression and justifies reprisals. This is the theological-political thinking at work in the accusation of Islamophobia. Far from being a sociological concept, as the good Western souls believe by projecting a form of benevolent, naive and doloristic empathy, Islamophobia is the screen for future aggressions. In fact, the entire decolonial discourse is based on this rhetoric of historical vengeance which is, literally, a carbon copy of Islamist susceptibility.

Victim manipulation

In the wake of 9/11, a victimhood narrative emerged, portraying Muslims as the presumed scapegoats of the attack. The term "Islamophobia" was notably promoted by the militant preacher Tariq Ramadan. It was also developed by sociologists like Vincent Geisser , who now, rather belatedly, acknowledges the harmful evolution of a concept that has become a mere pretext: "It is clear that the fight against Islamophobia has become a kind of highly lucrative 'community niche' that allows certain opinion leaders to exist in the public sphere." This is an understatement: if an organization like the CCIF (Collective Against Islamophobia in France) enjoyed such media success before its dissolution, it was because it used the concept of Islamophobia as a smokescreen for an Islamist doctrinal line disseminating the dogma of the Muslim Brotherhood—a fact finally acknowledged by the current Minister of the Interior, who referred to it as an "Islamist organization working against the Republic."

In line with the OIC's strategy of portraying itself as a victim, Islamophobia is a rallying cry whose subtext foments a separatism built on exacerbating hostility within the nation. Sociologist Shmuel Trigano had already clarified the fraudulent manipulation of these claims: "The ideological trick of Qaradawi and Ramadan is to conceal this project of separatism (and power) behind the veils of multiculturalism and human rights discourse."

Blackmail of Islamophobia and the instrumentalization of anti-Semitism

This was evident at the UNESCO World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Intolerance in Durban, held from September 2nd to 9th, 2001. This event became the stage for an indictment of Israel aimed at having Zionism recognized as racism. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion were even distributed , and Jews were heckled in the NGO forum. The final Durban report criticized the "rise of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia." Two days before the Islamist attacks on the World Trade Center, this equating of Jews and Muslims at a summit where only Israel was singled out sets the tone for the confusion of the Islamophobic blackmail: portraying Islam as a victim in need of defense at the very moment when Islamist terrorism was gaining strength and diplomatic influence.

This argumentative pattern has been repeated tirelessly ever since: accusations of Islamophobia against France are systematically accompanied by a victimhood narrative surrounding the Jewish symbol and anti-Zionist denigration. This was the case on November 10, 2019, during a march against Islamophobia infiltrated by Islamists, which provided an opportunity to appropriate the yellow star and promote alternative narratives depicting imaginary persecutions (on placards proclaiming "Jews yesterday, Muslims today") with the complicity of a segment of the French political and media establishment. The frenzied exploitation of antisemitism by Islamic organizations clearly demonstrates a hypocritical attempt to capture victimhood sympathy: emotional blackmail and revisionism thus coexisted with anti-Jewish slogans. In fact, when we observe that there are more protesters against Islamophobia than against Islamic terrorism, this confirms that the victimhood strategy is in line with the interests of Islamism.

Islamophobia, society, secularism

This demonstration also highlighted the striking contrast between this discourse of lamentation and the actual reality of anti-Muslim acts. The 2019 report on acts committed against religions, released by the Ministry of the Interior, was quite revealing: anti-Christian acts = 1063; anti-Semitic acts = 541; anti-Muslim acts = 100. The report noted that "anti-Muslim acts have reached their lowest level this year since 2010," while "the number of anti-Semitic incidents increased sharply in 2018 (74%) . " In January 2020, the government report noted that anti-Semitic incidents were up 27% and that "as for anti-Christian incidents, their number remained stable over the year, with 1052 incidents recorded" and that "as for anti-Muslim incidents, their number remained relatively low (154 incidents)".

This factual reality does not prevent the normalization of discourse on state Islamophobia. Worse, intellectuals are playing along with the destruction of cultural frameworks by promoting the idea of ​​proven persecution against Muslims and casting doubt on the concept of secularism: "Islamophobia is mainly conveyed by a part of the elites (journalists, experts, politicians) who defend a reactionary conception of secularism to legitimize discrimination against Muslims" ( Gérard Noiriel ).

We would like to see some kind of concept of secularism formulated in the OIC countries that prohibit religious equality, while French secularism allows everyone the free exercise of their religion. The zealots of Islamophobia know very well, however, that in some Muslim countries, Christianity or Judaism suffers from prohibition, discrimination, or legal restrictions—and that Muslim apostasy itself is forbidden. So what will we call the persecution of Muslims who no longer wish to be Muslim by other Muslims? Because it is now a cultural reality, even in the heart of Europe: when, in December 2020, the footballer Mohamed Salah posed as Santa Claus, he received insulting messages calling him a bad Muslim. It is the same motivation that explains why a baker in Nice of Tunisian origin is attacked for selling ham, or why a Muslim waitress is attacked for serving alcohol. And in the Maghreb, too, Muslims are being attacked for breaking the Ramadan fast. Abdelwahab Meddeb highlighted this fundamentalist logic regarding fasting as an identity marker, provoking religious pressure which he described as "a coercive, violent fast" where "those who fast despise those who break the fast, even exercising a form of moral policing over them." Should we speak of Islamophobia and racism here? Or should we explain to Muslim apostates, who are constantly at risk of being attacked, that they hold a reactionary view of secularism?

When, in February 2018, the University of Paris 7 organized a reading of Charb's text, " Letter to the Islamophobia Profiteers Who Play into the Hands of Racists ," the student union "Solidaires Etudiant-es" was quick to demand "the outright cancellation of this event." This knee-jerk reaction of censorship unfortunately illustrated the validity of a critique of Islamophobia, since the accusation of Islamophobia was indeed being used to silence criticism of Islam.

Recently, a philosophy professor, criticizing Islamism, was denounced by the mayor of Trappes, Ali Rabeh (who was recently celebrated by Libération ), and thus found himself at the mercy of Islamic vengeance. After Salman Rushdie, Theo Van Gogh, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Robert Redeker, and Charlie Hebdo , how many more Samuel Patys and Didier Lemaires will it take to understand where the sanctification of Islamophobia leads? Is it "reactionary" to consider that the Islamist conception of the integrity of the Muslim faith, propagated by the OIC, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State, and their European or French proxies, constitutes a danger to social harmony?

Such facts raise the question of the future ideological horizon and its relationship to the State, since secularism "ensures both the right to have or not to have a religion, to change it or to cease having one." However, in 2011, during a consultation with Muslim authorities by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a text drafted jointly with the Union of Islamic Organizations of France clearly indicated the priority of Sharia as defined by the OIC: "The mention of the right to change religion is notably removed at the request of the UOIF." (information report no. 757 to the Senate).

In the operational framework of the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood and those inspired by it, from the UOIF to the CCIF, the idea of ​​a cultural integration of Muslims in the secular framework is therefore part of the measures deemed "Islamophobic". Because this is what these activists call "state Islamophobia", that is to say the legal and political provisions that do not comply with Sharia law. French secularism should therefore comply with this conception of the Islamic faith in order to no longer be "Islamophobic". The seduction of a word that claims to be a bearer of social justice clearly shows its limits and does not stand up to examination of the political uses that are made of it as an intimidation ploy.

The destructive effect is as follows: through its systematic victimhood narrative, its proximity to Islamism, and its more or less direct challenge to secularism, Islamophobic discourse breeds mistrust of Islam. Simultaneously, it exacerbates anti-French sentiment and contributes to the deliberate ostracization of those who adopt this differentialist discourse. The Islamophobic incantation thus drives a wedge into the national community and divides it with a separatist injunction that Tariq Ramadan explicitly formulated: "Muslims living in Europe must know that they have no choice but to understand that they are represented by the values ​​they uphold." It is therefore no surprise that the pressure exerted on teachers has become constant: the discontent of some parents takes the form of a knee-jerk reaction, taking offense at what they consider an affront to their values ​​and identity. Death threats referring to the fate of Samuel Paty are now part of the social landscape.

A rhetorical trap in the service of division

The condemnation of racism, considered as “identity-based hatred” (to use Daniel Sibony’s term), is part of the national consensus. It is therefore convenient for activists to bring Islamophobia under the umbrella of anti-racism. This mechanism is perfectly described by Pierre-André Taguieff in *Islamism and Us* when he notes that “Islamists have an interest in making people believe that anti-Islamists are Islamophobic” and that they are therefore anti-Muslim “racists.” The surreptitious assimilation of any criticism of Islam to a subcategory of racism is in itself confusing, but it is indeed the aim of a political propaganda campaign unfolding within the Western framework. This is, moreover, the criticism that the Islamic Research Center of Al-Azhar Mosque leveled against President Macron’s remarks on separatism, accusing him of racism.

The instrumentalization of an accusatory category like Islamophobia to counter criticism of Islam has become the basic tactical weapon of decolonial rhetoric. This only serves to construct a vision of Islam that renders it fundamentally incompatible with a culture where free criticism is practiced. In this murky game, decolonial ideology ends up siding against the state, against the secularism spontaneously experienced by the majority of Muslims, and against freedom of expression. Exploiting a victimhood concept whose purpose is to serve as a tool of intimidation is a political and cultural trap for Muslims: it makes them captive to an indoctrination based on antagonism and creates a conflation with the Islamism that it claims to denounce.

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