[by Jean Szlamowicz]
This text originally appeared in a longer version in the magazine Texto! under the title "Inclusivism is a fundamentalism".
Inclusive writing starts with a good intention.
Or rather, it starts from a rather imprecise intention that does not ask any of the good questions inherent in its reformist approach: if it is a question of valuing women in society, why language? why just writing and not speaking? what concrete effects can be expected from it? what exactly is it a question of rectifying? how to interpret grammar? what about all the other grammatical phenomena?
Such a desire to regenerate language is not new, and its naive impulse might possess the poetic charm of an attention to the nuances of language. In this respect, it fits within the more or less fanciful linguistic quests described by Umberto Eco in The Search for the Perfect Language.
The utopia of improving language is truly fantastical and refers in history only to aesthetic, mystical, totalitarian, or at best sterile attempts (volapük and esperanto). Many linguists have therefore decided to shrug their shoulders and not worry about it. However, this linguistic fad - to eliminate the supposed sexism inherent in linguistic practices - has become a doctrine that can now be called "inclusivism" and which wants to impose itself in the world of knowledge, including through defamation and lies, entryism and scientific revisionism.
This sudden transformation—in the space of five years—of course raises a fundamental political-cognitive question: did the common language that activists used just a few months ago not prevent them from thinking about feminism properly? Or were they unknowingly sexist when they said “the candidate” and not “the candidate” and did they receive the revelation as an epiphany that provoked their conversion? Do they now have to atone for having dared to write “all” instead of “all and all” all their lives? Have the linguistic theories that they practiced just five years ago suddenly become obsolete? And are speakers and linguists who have not changed their theoretical frameworks or their oral and scriptural practices bastards?
In any case, some linguists have gone so far as to transform their interpretation of linguistic facts to consider " going to the hairdresser " a sexist expression compared to " going to prostitutes" : the culprit would be the preposition " at ," which supposedly signifies respect for the hairdresser, while " to the prostitutes" would be contemptuous of the sex workers. [1] To impose such a delusional projection implies—besides profound bad faith—a complete overhaul of the norms of language interpretation. This clearly illustrates that the various postulates, more or less implicit, that underpin linguistic inclusivism are in truth anti-scientific—and the proponents of this doctrine stubbornly refuse to address this issue.
tongue anatomy
The inclusivist error, fond of injustices to denounce, starts from the principle that everything is patriarchy and that everything must be "deconstructed". Language would therefore be sexist and would favor an "androcentric" vision of the world. Let us immediately refute this proposition making grammar the foundation of social organization: if we were to literally apply this idea that language expresses a vision of society, then speakers of genderless languages would be blind to sexual difference... We would then have to think that Armenian, Basque, Cantonese, Comanche, Finnish, Georgian, Igbo, Persian, Khmer, Turkish, Vietnamese, and Yoruba speakers share a conception of gender that would not succeed in distinguishing men from women!
If a discourse can be sexist, language as a structure is only what the speakers make of it: Olympe de Gouges can be a feminist in French as Tariq Ramadan cannot be even though he uses the same language. Would Ramadan become a feminist if he expressed his ideas in inclusive writing? Why then want to change the structures of the language that suited Simone de Beauvoir or Simone Veil so well?
The paradox is that the knowledge established in language sciences — but radically revised by inclusivists over the last ten years — demonstrates that we cannot take a shortcut that makes language an ideological framework that would condition individuals. To postulate the opposite is to propose a psychology of peoples classifying grammars according to the ideology that we would attribute to speakers: there would thus be primitive languages / peoples, evolved languages / peoples, etc. It is a form of ethnographic racism that has long since been put aside as outdated ideas.
That there is a domain of psychic and social life devoid of inequality should be welcomed with relief by these activists. However, this is a tipping point of their bad faith (or their ignorance): to justify their activism, it is necessary - at all costs - that the language be sexist.
Tongue pulled out by the hair
The interpretive strain is blatant among these activists who make aberrant proposals. In a recent inclusive work, [2] it is argued that "going to the hairdresser" is sexist because it is discriminatory towards the expression "going to prostitutes" because the preposition "to" supposedly indicates disrespect… The argument goes on to recommend, in the interest of egalitarianism, that we should henceforth say " going to the hairdresser ":
"When we want a haircut, we no longer go to the hairdresser's. Why then want to preserve the archaic use of "at" followed by a job title? [...] Why then continue to advocate "at the hairdresser's"? Maintaining this archaic usage is above all an abuse of language. Its only use is symbolic and social: to show or not respect the person designated ("at the hairdresser's"; "at the whores") or to distinguish oneself as a speaker. Where linguistic logic would like us to favor the use of "at" to designate only homes, the social logic of the search for distinction, even when it is based on a completely arbitrary rule linguistically, has blocked this trend and invented an exception."
We could simply quote it, so blatant is the absurdity. Nevertheless, let's unravel these arguments, whose fallacy demands thorough dismantling. It's impossible, moreover, to list all the inaccuracies: the use of " chez le coiffeur" (at the hairdresser's) is not archaic; there is no "linguistic logic" that pre-exists usage (quite the opposite: usage is studied precisely to observe a logic within it); there is no exaltation of social superiority in this usage, which is extremely common, and so on.
Let us methodically examine the flaws in the argument. First, " going to the hairdresser" and " going to prostitutes" are not statements but phrases: they are cited here without any real context; therefore, we cannot study their discursive intention. This would not normally be a flaw if the authors' argument did not presuppose a particular intention. This intention ("to show respect") is not demonstrated and contradicts the intuition of any speaker: how would " I don't want to go to that other jerk's place " show respect?
It is, in fact, quite laughable to see "chez" paraphrased in these authors' text as meaning "at the home of." As any speaker intuitively knows, " chez" can be followed by a number of complements unrelated to a dwelling:
Things aren't going very well for them (whether it's a company, a couple, a party, etc.).
Among academics, there is a tendency towards activism.
In Jankélévitch, depth of thought meets elegance of style.
The preposition *chez* does indeed come from * casa* , meaning "house" in Latin. This is an example of what is called grammaticalization in linguistics, that is, the loss of the denotative function in favor of syntactic functions. Nevertheless, the requirement remains that the noun must refer to a person: * Chez la SNCF, les tarifs de restauration sont scandaleux* (At SNCF, the catering rates are scandalous) doesn't really work. On the other hand—and this clearly proves that it's not a question of denotation but of collocation—it can be referred to with *chez* and a collective pronoun:
– At the SNCF, catering is expensive…
– Yeah, their prices are too high.
As a lexical legacy, we will therefore prefer to use chez to refer to a person or at least to a proper name ("Chez Casto, il y a tout ce qu'il faut!" ; "Votre électricité bientôt moins chère chez Leclerc?") or a pronoun ( chez eux ).
Questions of method
In their caricatured argument, the authors overlook the actual existence of the usages: " chez le coiffeur" (at the hairdresser's) does indeed exist alongside "au coiffeur" (at the hairdresser's), but not with the same nuances. Thus, one will find statements such as:
Okay, so while you're cleaning, I'm going to the grocery store first, then the butcher, then the hairdresser, and then the gas station.
Such a statement is typical of everyday spoken language—even if it seems incongruous in writing. Prescriptivism undoubtedly considers *à * incorrect in these cases, but corpora of spontaneous speech show that these forms exist. We therefore observe that * allez chez * and *aller à* tend to differ depending on whether the complement is considered an activity (* aller chez le coiffeur, ça me barbe *) or a place (* je vais d'abord au supermarché, et après au coiffeur *). This is what we discover if we choose to study linguistics and avoid both academic and activist normativity. We thus observe that different forms exist in writing and speech, that language registers exist, that certain forms are more or less common, that forms possess distinct values, that collocations lead to varying degrees of acceptability of forms, and so on.
Another flaw in this inclusive argument is that the authors arbitrarily link unrelated phrases. They completely neglect the descriptive approach, focusing instead on prescription without examining the phrase * aller à* (to go to ), which has different meanings depending on the complement. Indeed, the motive for travel can focus on a place (* aller à Londres* - to go to London ) or an activity ( * aller aux champignons* - to go mushroom hunting, to winter sports, to prostitutes ), or even develop intentional profiles such as *aller au contact* (to go into contact ), or aspectual profiles, such as * aller à la catastrophe* ( to go to disaster ). There is no mention of the fact that singular and plural forms are not interchangeable (* aller à la pute * - to go to a prostitute ), that * chez* (at/at) refers to the existence of a commercial establishment, etc.
Let us also remember that the denotative meaning of words is not fixed by the lexicon: going to church does not have the same meaning in "he is very pious, he goes to church every Sunday" and in "for my jogging, I go to church, I pass by the cemetery and I go around the lake": in one case, going to church designates a practice of religious observance, in the other case a journey where church denotes a building.
Another oversight in this frenzy of inclusive prescriptive language is the very meaning of the expression " at the hairdresser's ." Indeed, besides the fact that this profession is often embodied by a female hairdresser , it doesn't actually refer to a person but to a business. In this respect, we must even consider, semantically, that the word "hairdresser" doesn't designate a person, but a routinized scenario that, extralinguistically, refers to a multitude of individuals (the receptionist, the person who washes the hair, the person who cuts it, etc.).
In fact, going to the hairdresser belongs to a paradigm of going to + shopkeeper . In these alternations, the constraint is not denotative but semantic-formal: *chez* is usually followed by a person, while *à* is followed by a place: * aller chez le boucher * vs. * aller à la boucherie*; *aller chez le garagiste* vs. * aller au garage *. There is no apparent sexual or social issue here.
Incidentally, what kind of mental construct led the authors to believe that the semantic continuum * casa * / *chez* / * maison* could only refer to a dwelling? A commercial establishment is also called a * maison *.
Mariage Frères, tea house
Aubercy is a very beautiful Parisian house
This is a decent house here!
Prescription, rules, uses
In Candéa and Véron's texts, the utopian prescriptivism of deciding social judgment based on usage instead of usage itself is irrelevant. Since an archaism is a form that is no longer used, how can one consider something commonplace to be archaic? Rather illogically, the authors proclaim, "Can one cite a grammatical rule that justifies this?" while simultaneously attacking the very rule that, after * aller* (to go ), the name of a profession must be introduced by the preposition * chez* (at/at ). This is precisely the rule they oppose. But what do they mean by "rule"? They confuse, intentionally or not, the different meanings of the word " rule" : "grammar rule" can refer to the prescriptive formulation of certain usages in teaching, and "grammar rule" can have a strictly descriptive value and designate a judgment of grammaticality ("in French, one cannot have a personal pronoun subject of a non-tense verb form like ' je dormir '"). Of course, "rule" also has a connotation of authority that pertains to the legal field. It is an antanaclasis to use "rule" in both cases without distinguishing between them.
As we have seen, *aller + chez + métier* is a common form, undoubtedly much more so than * aller + à + métier *, and is therefore prescribed for its sociolinguistic value, considered preferential. This is prescriptive but also based on usage. There is an interaction between usage and prescription, which essentially defines what we call the norm. Failing to differentiate between norm, usage, error, correctness, social value, and grammaticality leads to a hodgepodge of reasoning. One cannot simultaneously prescribe one usage ("one must say * aller au coiffeur *") and object to the prescription of another by invoking the connotative power of the word * rule* . The same applies to the word *grammar *, often used indiscriminately, conflating its different meanings: *grammar* in the academic sense, that is, institutional pedagogical practices, and * grammar* in the linguistic sense, which refers to the structural workings of a language.
Furthermore, the "feminist" lens is completely ineffective in explaining the value of prepositions. Lexical axiology is what's relevant: if there is any pejorative connotation, it's obviously in the word "whore" and not in the preposition "to the "! And besides, like all colloquial, vulgar, or obscene words, "whore" is also an indicator of register and doesn't necessarily carry a negative judgment. Is there, moreover, less social judgment in "prostitute" than in "whore" ? The interaction of register, semantics, context, and argumentation determines the value of the statement. In short—analytical banality—everything depends on what one wants to say… Therefore, one must reason in relation to discourse and not in relation to dictionary abstractions.
Even so, the multitude of expressions with aller + à shows that aller aux putes (to go to prostitutes) is actually perfectly regular. Indeed, this expression also exists with nouns that do not refer to a place or a business (unlike aller chez le coiffeur - to go to the hairdresser ) but to an activity embodied by various objects. Aller aux putes therefore belongs to the same paradigm as:
Go for mushrooms (strawberries, asparagus, blueberries, etc.)
Go to winter sports
Go to the fields
Go to news
Go to photocopies,
Go to the provisions
Go to the flea market
Go to the movies (i.e., to the cinema , in Quebec French)
What are whores doing in this?
Comparing hairdressers and prostitutes is a selective association based on a completely arbitrary bias. What could possibly be the link between two expressions in a language? How can you explain one phrase by using another that has little in common? In short, what do prostitutes have to do with it?
Adding to the absurdity, the ideological premise of these remarks, which so catastrophically fail to establish a link between grammar and society, is to argue that semantic and grammatical pejoration weighs heavily on women to the benefit of men. Do we really need to point out to them that, in fact, hairdressing is a radically feminized profession?
At the root of this jumble of sterile analyses, the authors evoke the notion of "social utility", which is as pompous as it is incredibly vague and without tangible reality. By what madness can we imagine that when a speaker says he goes to the hairdresser, it is to humiliate prostitutes with prepositions?
Clearly, the advanced state of cretinism of such virtuous grandiloquence constitutes an offense against the university, science and common sense. So it is to analyses of this level that we would rely to reform the language on a moral basis? We would still have to be capable of an objective description to propose rules!
[1] French is ours! A short manual for linguistic emancipation , Candea & Véron, La Découverte, 2019
[2] French is ours! A short manual of linguistic emancipation , Candea & Véron, La Découverte, 2019 and https://theconversation.com/aller-chez-le-coiffeur-mais-aller-aux-putes-ce-que-revele-lusage-des-prepositions-114557